Read the interview
Paul Rübig in a navy suit and light blue tie, leaning on the handrail of a glass staircase in an atrium

GRAND INTERVIEW · INTERVIEWS

PAUL RÜBIG

Can Europe Still Shape Its Economic Future?

FrançaisEnglish

Read the interview

Introduction

Can Europe still shape its own economic future? Amid global competition, energy costs, the financing of innovation and growing pressure on water resources, this question now extends far beyond industrial policy. It concerns Europe's ability to retain its expertise, businesses and economic autonomy.

An Austrian former Member of the European Parliament for more than twenty-three years, Paul Rübig approaches these challenges as both an industrial entrepreneur and a former European policymaker. Today, he serves on the European Economic and Social Committee and the Administrative Board of the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). He argues for a Europe that produces, invests and innovates rather than relying on regulatory influence alone.

In this written interview with JLPDécryptage, he examines industrial value chains, barriers to scaling businesses, energy choices and the strategic importance of water. He also reflects on decisions he would revisit from his parliamentary career and the choices the next generation of European leaders must be prepared to make.

Grand Interview

01Europe’s industrial point of no return

JLPDécryptage

Europe is debating how to preserve its industrial capacity while managing higher energy costs, technological change and global competition. Drawing on your experience as both an industrial entrepreneur and a European policymaker, which capabilities would be hardest to rebuild once lost—and what concrete decisions should Europe make now to protect them?

Paul Rübig

Speaking as both an industrial entrepreneur and a member of the European Economic and Social Committee, I know that Europe's hardest-to-rebuild capabilities are those that grew over decades: industrial value chains, energy-intensive processing know-how, machinery and plant engineering, and above all our dual vocational training system with its skilled workers.

A lost basic-materials industry does not just shed jobs — it loses process knowledge, supplier networks and research proximity that no resolution can bring back. That is why we need a technology-open energy policy: energy efficiency, renewables, nuclear power and renewable gases must all be part of the mix so that electricity for SMEs and industry becomes competitive again.

Europe must finally deliver — faster permitting, real acceleration of grid expansion and renewables, as I have consistently demanded in my opinions on the internal electricity market and the Energy Union. SMEs are the backbone of our economy — 99 % of all firms and two thirds of jobs — so their burden from reporting obligations and bureaucracy must be radically halved, freeing them to invest in digitalisation and climate action. Innovation is born in the Mittelstand, but SMEs need access to risk and growth capital and a unified patent and capital-market framework in order to scale up.

Public procurement and the circular economy should deliberately strengthen European lead technologies and regional value creation. Skills and re-skilling alliances — from apprenticeships to lifelong learning on the job — are the cheapest industrial policy there is, because skilled workers cannot simply be imported like goods. International free trade agreements with high standards secure SMEs' access to world markets, while we reduce strategic dependencies on critical raw materials by building our own processing capacity in Europe.

If we now lower energy costs, cut red tape, invest in people and keep value chains in Europe, then Europe will not only stay rich but become stronger again — that is my conviction as an entrepreneur and a European.

02From European research to global companies

JLPDécryptage

In your work on the EU’s start-up and scale-up strategy, you have addressed the difficulties European innovators face in bringing ideas to market and growing across borders. At what precise stage does Europe lose the most economic value—from research, through financing, to commercial expansion—and which single reform would make the greatest difference?

Paul Rübig

In my work on the EU's start-up and scale-up strategy, I see clearly that Europe does not lose the value at the research stage — our universities and research institutes are world-class — but at the scale-up stage, when a company has proven its product and needs large amounts of capital to grow across borders and enter industrial production.

This is precisely where our best innovators sell to American or Asian buyers, or move their headquarters abroad, and with them go the patents, the jobs, the tax revenue and the entire value chain.

The root cause is our fragmented capital market: 27 national systems, no pan-European pension and venture capital, and risk aversion that keeps savings in bank deposits instead of investing them in innovation. The single most important reform is therefore the completion of the Capital Markets Union and the Savings and Investments Union — one European market for risk capital, with harmonised insolvency rules, unified listing requirements and pension funds that can invest Europe-wide. As long as a start-up needs 27 different legal opinions to scale across the Single Market, we are not truly competitive, so standardised company law and mutual recognition of national rules are part of the same reform.

At the same time, procurement policy must open up to innovative SMEs — public buyers should be able to choose the best European solution, not just the lowest price, which is a point I have made repeatedly in my EESC opinions. We must also make it easier for SMEs to grow through acquisitions and equity participation, because in Europe many founders still fear that outside capital means losing control of their life's work.

Tax incentives for business angels, employee stock ownership and a genuine European scale-up fund — as proposed in the Draghi report — would channel private savings into productive investment. For me as an entrepreneur, the message is simple: capital must flow as freely across borders as goods already do, and talent must be able to move without bureaucratic barriers, including through a true European mobility framework for researchers and skilled workers. If we get this one reform right — deep, liquid, pan-European capital markets combined with a genuine Single Market for services and procurement — then the next generation of European champions will be built here, scaled here and will pay their taxes here.

03The energy trilemma

JLPDécryptage

European industrial policy must balance affordable energy, security of supply and decarbonisation. When these objectives come into conflict, how should governments decide what to prioritise? What would a credible, long-term energy framework look like for a European manufacturer making an investment today?

Paul Rübig

From my experience as an industrial entrepreneur, I would say this triad is not a triangle of equal sides: without affordable energy there is no industry at all, and without industry there is nobody left to finance decarbonisation or security — so affordability and supply security are the precondition, and climate policy must be designed as industrial policy, not against it. Governments should therefore prioritise by a simple test: does a measure keep energy-intensive and SME production viable in Europe today while moving us towards climate neutrality by 2050 — if it fails the first half, it destroys the very base it claims to protect. This means technology openness as a legal principle: renewables, nuclear, hydropower, hydrogen and renewable gases, carbon capture and efficient fossil transition technologies must all compete on cost and CO₂, without ideology picking winners. A credible long-term framework for a manufacturer investing today would start with a binding European target for internationally competitive electricity prices for industry — with grids, storage and flexibility rewarded so that cheap renewable hours can actually be used by factories. It needs a genuine internal energy market, accelerated permitting and grid expansion, because today the bottleneck is no longer generation but connections and administrative delay. Price volatility must be tamed through long-term power purchase agreements, capacity mechanisms and industrial heat strategies, so that an investor can calculate a 15-year business case rather than gamble on spot markets. Carbon leakage protection — CBAM extended to downstream products — must be robust and permanent, because no one builds a plant in Europe if climate costs are simply outsourced along with the jobs. Stability matters more than perfection: investors will accept ambitious targets if rules are reliable, so every revision should come with grandfathering, transition periods and impact assessments on SMEs, as we have consistently demanded in the EESC. Energy efficiency first is not a slogan but the cheapest security of supply — every kilowatt-hour saved is one we do not have to import — and it deserves first-rank treatment in the framework. Finally, the framework must be social: if citizens and SMEs see energy prices falling as a result of European investment, they will support the transition; if they see only costs, the whole project is at risk, and this is why competitiveness, security and decarbonisation must be pursued together, in that order of precondition.

04Water as a condition of competitiveness

JLPDécryptage

Your 2026 work on water resilience places water alongside other strategic economic resources. Should water availability and infrastructure reliability become explicit criteria in European industrial and investment decisions? If so, how could that be done without placing disproportionate burdens on water-stressed regions?

Paul Rübig

Yes — water must become an explicit criterion in European industrial and investment decisions, because no factory, no data centre, no semiconductor plant and no hydrogen electrolyser runs without reliable water supply, and in a growing number of European regions water has become as strategic as energy. In my 2026 work on water resilience I have argued that water should be treated exactly like other critical economic resources: as a factor of location, of security and of long-term competitiveness, and therefore part of every serious industrial policy. The first step is a European water stress map and standardized availability data, so that investors and public authorities can assess water risk at a site with the same rigour as grid connection or energy costs. The second step is to integrate water into the permitting and state-aid frameworks: EU industrial projects and Important Projects of Common European Interest should demonstrate water-efficient design, reuse and recycling concepts — not as an obstacle, but as a quality criterion. The third step is financing: the EU budget, InvestEU and the European Investment Bank should prioritise water infrastructure, leakage reduction, reuse networks and closed-loop industrial water systems, because Europe loses a scandalous share of its water through leaking networks before it ever reaches a consumer or a company. Crucially, this must not become a burden that punishes water-stressed regions — on the contrary, they need solidarity and support, in the same way energy-poor regions received cohesion funding for the energy transition. That means water-efficiency requirements should be paired with dedicated EU funding, technical assistance and longer transition periods for regions in the Mediterranean and elsewhere already under stress, so standards become an investment trigger, not an investment deterrent. Technology is our greatest opportunity here: European industry — pumps, membranes, monitoring, digital metering, wastewater treatment — is a world leader in water technology, and every euro of water resilience investment strengthens a European export sector as well, which is smart industrial policy in both directions. SMEs must be protected through proportionality: simple reporting, benchmarking and best-practice exchange instead of heavy bureaucracy, and water costs that reward efficiency rather than penalising small businesses. If we combine reliable data, water-smart investment criteria, EU co-financing for stressed regions and support for our water-technology industry, we turn a looming vulnerability into a European strength — that is exactly the approach I advocate in my work on water resilience.

05When industrial ambition meets water limits

JLPDécryptage

Consider a region seeking to attract data centres, semiconductor production or hydrogen projects while facing increasing pressure on local water resources. What evidence should determine whether such a project goes ahead, and who should be accountable for balancing industrial opportunity against long-term water security?

Paul Rübig

The evidence must come before the announcement, not after: a project of this scale should only go ahead on the basis of a water balance for the catchment area — how much renewable and usable water is available, what other users including agriculture, households and ecosystems depend on, and what the outlook is under climate scenarios for the next thirty years. A single dry year must not be the benchmark; the decision has to withstand a drought sequence, because a data centre, a fab or an electrolyser is a decades-long commitment and the region's water security must be proven for that entire horizon. The second piece of evidence is the project's own water footprint: consumption per unit of output, cooling technology chosen, use of treated wastewater or seawater instead of potable water, and a binding commitment to closed-loop or air cooling where technically feasible — the best available technology principle that has served European environmental law well. Third, cumulative impact: one project may look acceptable alone, but the combination of a fab, two data centres and an electrolyser in one valley can exceed the limits, so the assessment must be basin-wide and binding for all pending projects together. Fourth, the seasonal dimension — data centres and fabs run 24/7, while water availability peaks with snowmelt and winter rain, so storage, demand management and priority rules for scarcity periods must be part of the permit. Accountability belongs at the level where the whole basin is governed, not with the municipality happy about the tax base: river basin authorities together with regional governments must carry the decision, and they must be obliged to consult farmers, SMEs and citizens, because those who bear the risk must have a voice. The industrial developer must be contractually accountable — measurable efficiency targets, escrowed guarantees for water-saving retrofits, and an obligation to reduce consumption first when scarcity hits, before households and agriculture are restricted. In my view as EESC member, social and territorial dialogue is not decoration but legitimacy: if the population concludes that a giant investor drinks their water while they face restrictions, acceptance collapses and the investment is at risk too. EU state aid rules should reward projects that create local value — jobs, supplier networks, water technology partnerships with local SMEs — and not merely the largest subsidy package, so the region gets more than a water bill. If the evidence shows the basin cannot carry the project even with best technology, the honest answer is relocation within Europe to a water-rich site or a commitment to desalination and reuse funded by the investor — because Europe's interest is to keep these industries on our continent, but not at any price in any one place.

06A European decision worth revisiting

JLPDécryptage

You served in the European Parliament from 1996 to 2019, through major changes in the European economy and its institutions. Looking back, is there an economic or industrial policy decision that you would approach differently today? What did subsequent experience teach you that was not sufficiently understood at the time?

Paul Rübig

Looking back at my 23 years in the European Parliament, the decision I would approach most differently is our handling of energy policy in the 2000s and early 2010s — we liberalised the market and celebrated falling wholesale prices, but we did not sufficiently grasp that Europe was simultaneously making itself structurally dependent on imported Russian gas, and that market liberalisation without a geopolitical risk assessment is not security. We treated energy as a commodity when it was in fact a strategic dependency; subsequent experience — especially 2022 — taught us that price alone is not a measure of policy success if the supplier can weaponise the relationship. The second lesson concerns competitiveness: we in the EPP and in Parliament believed that ambitious climate legislation, once adopted, would automatically be matched by equivalent efforts in China, the US and our other competitors — we overestimated the disciplining effect of international negotiation and underestimated how quickly our energy-intensive industries would face a double burden of high costs and carbon leakage. Today I would insist on ex-ante competitiveness impact assessments for every major directive, including effects on SMEs, and I say this with some satisfaction that the EESC and the new Commission have now made exactly this the standard. Third, we underestimated the cumulative bureaucracy of well-intentioned rules: each directive was justified on its own, but the sum of them — REACH, reporting obligations, procurement rules, financial regulation — became a burden that European SMEs feel daily and that I only fully grasped when I returned to working with Mittelstand companies, who taught me more about the real cost of legislation than any impact study. We also relied too long on the assumption that open markets would keep European production at home — the idea that we could specialise in services and design while manufacturing migrated east was a mistake of economic theory, not just of policy; value chains, know-how and innovation depend on production staying close. On the euro crisis, I remain convinced that stability and budget discipline were necessary, but I would today argue more strongly for investment-led consolidation — every euro of austerity needed a euro of structural reform and investment in infrastructure and education. What was not sufficiently understood at the time was the speed of technological and geopolitical change: we legislated for a world of moderate, predictable change, while today's world demands framework legislation that is resilient to shocks — which is why I now argue for technology openness and review clauses rather than detailed prescriptions. My conclusion from these decades is optimistic nonetheless: Europe has always learned from crisis, and the Single Market, the euro and enlargement were the right decisions that made us prosperous — but we must now finally complete the unfinished business, the Capital Markets Union, the Single Market in services and energy, so that the next generation makes fewer expensive detours than mine did.

07A challenge from the next generation

JLPDécryptage

Imagine a young European founder telling you that it is easier to finance, scale and retain control of an ambitious company outside the EU. Which parts of that argument would you accept, which would you challenge, and what must Europe change to give that entrepreneur a convincing reason to stay?

Paul Rübig

I would accept the core of the founder's argument with honesty, because the evidence is on their side: at the scale-up stage, when a company needs tens or hundreds of millions to grow, capital in Europe is scarcer, more risk-averse and more fragmented than in the US — and so our best companies, from Spotify's early financing round to countless deeptech firms, have had to look abroad or sell themselves entirely. I also accept the point about exit markets: a listing on Nasdaq still values growth companies more generously than most European exchanges, and employee stock options — the currency with which American start-ups attract talent — remain tax-penalised and legally cumbersome in too many member states. I would accept, too, that the perception of bureaucracy is real for a founder who spends evenings on compliance instead of customers, and I say that as someone who has spent decades fighting this in Parliament and in the EESC. But I would challenge the argument on several grounds. First, the gap is closing: the Savings and Investments Union, the Listing Act, the European Scale-up Fund proposed by the Draghi report and the 28th regime for company law are precisely designed to remove these frictions, and a founder leaving today is walking away from a market in the middle of being fixed. Second, I would challenge the claim on talent and control: Europe's dual education systems, engineering depth and quality of life let founders build loyal, highly skilled teams at costs that Silicon Valley cannot match, and growing globally from a European base has never been easier in a Single Market of 450 million consumers. Third, on control specifically — Europe in fact offers founders better protection against hostile dilution and short-term shareholder pressure than the American model of founder control through dual-class shares, which Europe is now introducing in a regulated form, so staying does not mean losing your company. Fourth, the argument ignores risk in the other direction: building your company under a jurisdiction where you have no political voice, on a continent where your market is not your home market, creates dependencies that many American-listed European founders have come to regret. And fifth, I would challenge the implicit assumption that financing is the whole story — a company needs customers, and for deeptech, industrial tech and the green transition, Europe's industrial customer base, public procurement and Horizon partnerships are assets the US simply does not offer in the same form. What must change is now well defined: complete the Capital Markets Union and channel Europe's 33 trillion euros of savings into venture and growth capital; make employee stock options tax-neutral across borders; cut reporting obligations radically for small listed and unlisted companies; create a single European company form so a founder scales in one legal framework, not 27; and open public procurement to innovative SMEs so that Europe's biggest customer buys from its own founders. I would tell that young founder what I told my own apprentices back home in Wels: you do not build the future by leaving the house that needs renovation — you build it by renovating the house while you live in it. Stay, build, hire, and hold us accountable — the EESC and every SME representative in Brussels are your allies in this fight, and Europe's comeback as a start-up continent will be written by the founders who bet on it now.

08What should Europe preserve—and question?

JLPDécryptage

After a career spanning industry, European politics and economic policy, which principle should the next generation of European leaders preserve above all others? And which long-established assumption about Europe’s economic future should they have the courage to challenge?

Paul Rübig

The principle I would pass on is stability through partnership — the social market economy, the German-Austrian "Soziale Marktwirtschaft" combined with the European ideal of never again letting this continent solve its conflicts through violence and its economies through unilateralism. That is the foundation everything else rests on: social partnership between employers and employees, which in Austria and Germany has kept industrial peace for decades, consensus between member states, and the balance between economic freedom on the one hand and social cohesion and environmental responsibility on the other. And within it, one conviction above all: that the small and medium-sized enterprise is not a nostalgic appendix to the economy but its beating heart, and that policy must always be measured by whether a family business in Upper Austria or a start-up in Lisbon can grow, invest and pass something on to the next generation. The assumption they should have the courage to challenge is our deep belief that Europe's future prosperity can be built primarily on regulation — that we lead the world by setting standards others will follow, the so-called Brussels effect. For two decades we acted as if writing the best rulebook would secure our competitiveness; the evidence now shows that a rulebook without industrial capacity, affordable energy and venture capital leads to a continent that regulates brilliantly while others produce, scale and sell. Challenging this does not mean deregulating everything — our high standards for workers, consumers and the environment are part of Europe's identity and its competitive edge in quality markets — but it means shifting the default question from "how do we regulate this?" to "how do we make this possible?", from control to enablement. They should challenge, too, the assumption that consensus among 27 is the highest good even when it produces the slowest common denominator — sometimes leadership means a group of member states moving ahead, as with the euro, and trusting the others to follow. And they should question the belief that Europe's demographic decline is a fate to be managed rather than a call to action: on talent, on migration, on lifelong learning, on later retirement in good health, our generation too often treated ageing as an accounting problem instead of mobilising the unused potential of millions. To the next generation I would say: preserve the partnership model, but lose the reflex of caution; you will need more speed, more risk capital and more ambition than my generation showed, and you are the first generation that can build Europe's future with the tools — digital, green, global — that we only began to build. Europe has always been strongest when it was young, ambitious and a little impatient — the founders of the Coal and Steel Community were, after all, mostly in their thirties and forties — and my wish is that this impatience returns. If they hold on to solidarity and social partnership while finding the courage to challenge the comfort of regulation-as-policy, they will not only preserve what we built, they will build what we could not.

Portrait of Paul Rübig smiling, in a black suit and light blue tie, hands clasped

About Paul Rübig

Born in 1953 in Wels, Upper Austria, Paul Rübig is an Austrian industrial entrepreneur and former politician. With a background in engineering and business administration, he held management responsibilities in the family-owned RÜBIG group, which operates in forging, heat treatment and industrial equipment. He has served on the advisory board of Rübig Holding since 2019.

After serving in the Upper Austrian regional parliament from 1991 to 1995 and briefly in Austria's National Council in 1996, he entered the European Parliament in January 1996. Until July 2019, his parliamentary work focused in particular on industry, research, energy and budgets. He also chaired STOA, the European Parliament's Science and Technology Options Assessment body.

Since October 2020, he has been a member of the European Economic and Social Committee's Employers' Group. Since January 2024, he has served on the Administrative Board of the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). He was also a member of the Governing Board of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) from July 2020 to June 2024. His ACER declaration of interests additionally records an external advisory role with Water Europe since May 2022.

Bringing together industrial experience and European institutional work, his interests include SME competitiveness, innovation, energy and water resilience.

Interview by Julien Laurenceau Porte

Cover of the book Emergency Preparedness — A Sustainable Energy, Food & Water Future, by Paul Rübig and Achim Kaspar

The book

Emergency Preparedness

A Sustainable #Energy #Food #Water Future

Paul Rübig · Achim Kaspar

2nd extended edition · Trauner

Co-written with Achim Kaspar, this book on crisis preparedness extends several themes of the interview: energy, food and water.

Institutional sources